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The American Society of Hispanic Economists (ASHE)—a member of the Allied Social Science Association—is a professional association of economists and other social scientists who are concerned with the under-representation of Hispanic Americans in the economics profession and with the lack of research generated on Hispanic American economic and policy issues. Our primary goals include:

1. Promoting the vitality of Hispanics in the economics profession through education, service, and excellence;
2. Promoting rigorous research on economic and policy issues affecting U.S. Hispanic communities and the nation as a whole; and
3. Engaging more Hispanic Americans to effectively participate in the economics profession.

For more information about ASHE, please contact our current president Fernando Lozano at fernando.lozano@pomona.edu or visit our website at www.asheweb.net.
Letter from the ASHE President

Jose Manuel Fernandez

This year has been a year like no other. We are experiencing the worse economics crisis since the Great Depression. The loss of jobs and small businesses makes the Great Recession pale in comparison. The COVID-19 pandemic has brought significant loses to our physical health, our mental health, and or economy. The economy at times feels like it is in a state of suspended animation. More than ever, we need people who understands how markets work. We need individuals ready with the knowledge to grow our society again. We also need members of ASHE to research and to write the papers that inform the greater public about the Hispanics, Latino, Latina, and Latinx experience in the United States.

COVID-19 has disproportionately affected Latin American communities in the United States. Collectively, Latinos and Blacks account for 55 percent of coronavirus cases according to CDC data, 33 percent and 22 percent respectively (Stokes et. al 2020). The hospitalization rate among Hispanic or Latinos is 407.8 per 100,000 population, which is approximately 4 times larger than the White non-Hispanic rate of 93.5 per 100,000. When we disaggregate these counts by age groups, we find that 11 percent of hospitalizations for people over the age of 65 years old are Hispanic or Latino, but for individuals less than 65 years old the percentage is 31 percent. Similarly, the age adjusted COVID-19 mortality percentage for Hispanic or Latino is 19.4 percent.

There are multiple reasons for why this population is so adversely affected. First, the CDC reports that hospitalizations are 12 times more likely among individuals with underlying conditions such as cardiovascular disease, diabetes, and chronic lung disease. The prevalence of these conditions among the Hispanic or Latino population are 5.1 percent (coronary heart disease), 13.2 percent (diabetes), and 5.4 percent (chronic lung disease) (Diaz et. Al 2018). Diabetes cases are 1.7 times more likely for Hispanic adults relative to non-Hispanic Whites. Hispanics are also 1.2 times more likely than non-Hispanic whites to be overweight or obese. 80.4 percent of Hispanics over the age of 20 are obese or overweight.

Second, Hispanic/Latinos make up 21 percent of all essential workers (McNicholas and Poydock 2020). The two largest industries with Hispanic essential workers are Food and Agriculture (28 percent) as well as industrial, commercial, residential facilities and services (40 percent). Hispanic/Latinos were also hit hard by the COVID-19 recession. The unemployment rates for Hispanic/Latinos was 16.9 percent in the second quarter and 11.2 percent in the third quarter compared to the White unemployment rates of 10.8 percent and 7.9 percent, respectively.

Third, there exists cultural and family composition differences among Hispanic households relative to the rest of the US. Hispanic households, on average, are 1.34 times larger than non-Hispanic households. Approximately, 22 percent of Hispanic households are multigenerational with 47 percent of these household

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containing two adult generations and 48 percent containing three or more adult generations (Taylor et al 2010). When we consider how common it is to greet a loved one with a kiss and a hug under these conditions, then you can see how quickly a virus could spread within a household.

I hope we can bring the American Society of Hispanic Economists to the forefront of issues facing the United States. Our collective voice can speak to the issues of race across ethnic groups, about the disparities in health, about the effects of immigration policies on employment and production.

I commend the tireless work of our executive committee especially our current president Monica Garcia-Perez. She has created several opportunities for our members to meet reporters at major outlets such as Bloomberg and the Wall Street Journal. She has dramatically increased the number of our institutional members. She has shown organization and poise leading this organization through the pandemic.

I hope to continue the work put forth by her and our past presidents. Two major initiatives we wish to start in the following year is a mentorship program and a scholarly journal. We want to provide value added to our members through professional development session, an outlet for your scholarly work, and highlighting the contributions you have made to the general public.

My motivation in servicing ASHE remains the same, I want to celebrate our membership.

Thank you for giving me the opportunity and your trust.

Sincerely,

Jose M. Fernandez

References


Number of Latino eligible voters projected to reach record 31.5 million, but most worry COVID-19 outbreak will disrupt November election

Mark Hugo Lopez, Pew Research Center

For the first time in a presidential election year, Latinos are projected to be the nation’s largest racial or ethnicity minority among Americans eligible to vote (Cilluffo and Fry, 2019). A record 31.5 million Latinos will be vote eligible (adult U.S. citizens) in November, accounting for 13.3% of the national electorate, also a new high.

At the same time, Latinos, like all voters, remain concerned about national circumstances. Seven-in-ten say they are dissatisfied with the nation’s direction and two-thirds (68%) disapprove of the job President Trump is doing, according to an April 2020 survey by the Pew Research Center (2020a). But how many will turn out to vote and what impact they may have on the 2020 presidential election remains to be seen, especially considering the COVID-19 outbreak’s economic, health and election impacts on Latinos and the nation. Three-quarters (76%) of Latinos say they are worried the coronavirus outbreak will disrupt the November election (Pew Research Center, 2020b).

Interest in the election among Latinos is low. In June 2020, just 35% of Latinos said they were following news about the presidential election closely, a lower share than among white Americans (61%), Black Americans (47%) or English-speaking Asian Americans (45%) (Pew Research Center, 2020c).

Record numbers of Latinos have voted in presidential elections and 2020 is likely to see a record Latino turnout too. Yet voter turnout rates among Latino eligible voters lag other groups (Krogstad and Lopez, 2017). For example, in 2016, fewer than half (47.5%) of Latinos eligible to vote did so, significantly below turnout rates among whites (65.3%) or blacks (59.6%) and slightly below that of Asians (49.3%). This is partly because of fast growth in the number of Latinos eligible to vote – between 2016 and 2020 some 4.5 million additional Latinos will be vote eligible, sharply increasing the base of potential voters. There are two principal sources for this growth. Some 3.5 million U.S.-born Latinos will come of age between 2016 and 2020. And another one million Latino immigrants will have

1 Mark Hugo Lopez, Ph.D., is Director of Hispanic Research at the Pew Research Center.
naturalized over the same period. Most of them are first-time voters this year and are two groups that traditionally turnout to vote at lower rates than other groups of U.S. voters, though immigrant Latinos vote at higher rates than U.S. born Latinos (Budiman, Noe-Bustamante and Lopez. 2020). Along with demographics is the geography of Latino voters. Most live-in states that have not been presidential battlegrounds. As a result, they receive less attention from candidates and campaigns, possibly impacting voter turnout.

There is also a question of how the Latino vote will break in November 2020. Recent national polls show Democrat Joe Biden has a 58% to 33% advantage over President Donald Trump among Latino registered voters (Enten, 2020). But not all Latinos are Democrats and historically, Latino support for Democrats has risen and fallen since the 1980s. Biden’s support among Latinos is below Democrat Hillary Clinton’s level in 2016, when pre-election polls showed her with a 61% to 23% advantage (Enten, 2020). Notably, Trump’s victory in 2016 depended partly on the Latino vote in Florida, a state where he won about half of the Cuban American vote (Krogstad and Flores, 2016). It is still early, and much can change with unexpected events, campaign developments, new election systems and the interest of Latinos in voting this year. This is especially true during the COVID-19 outbreak, George Floyd protests, new racial equality movements and more.

High, but sometimes unrealized, turnout expectations for the Latino vote
Each election season, reporters, politicians, researchers, and the public grow interested in the potential of the Latino vote. Phrases describing the group’s potential, like “a sleeping giant”, hint at the expectation that Latino voters will shape the nation’s politics, injecting their views into policy and perhaps propelling Democrats to key wins around the country. Yet the reality of the Latino vote has been something different. While record numbers vote in presidential and midterm elections, population growth and not necessarily greater electoral participation drive gains. Between 2012 and 2016, for example, the number of adult U.S. citizen Latinos (eligible voters) grew by nearly 4 million. The number of voters grew too, but by a lesser amount – 1.5 million votes. As a result, the voter turnout rate among Latino eligible voters fell slightly, from 48% in 2012 to 47.6% in 2016. This highlights a long-standing trend – more Latinos do not vote than do.

![Figure 2](Image)

**Figure 2**

Latino voter turnout rate falls slightly in 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% of eligible voters who say they voted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** Eligible voters are U.S. citizens ages 18 and older. Whites, blacks and Asians include only non-Hispanics. Hispanics are of any race. Data for non-Hispanic Asians were not available in 1988.


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Latino voter turnout has at times surged. In 2018, the number of Latino voters grew sharply to a record 11.7 million – a near presidential-election-year level of turnout – and up by nearly 5 million votes over 2014. The Latino voter turnout rate surged too to 40.4%, up from a record low 27% in 2014. Even so, this surge was not unique to Latino voters as every major demographic subgroup of Americans saw an increase in voter participation in 2018 relative to 2014. U.S. voter turnout in 2018 was the highest seen since 1978 and marked the highest overall voter turnout for a midterm election since 1982 (Krogstad, Noe-Bustamante and Flores, 2019).

The November election is likely to be different because of the coronavirus outbreak, social distancing, and quarantines. Many states, for example, may move to a system where any voter can vote by mail, something 79% of Latinos support as does 70% of the U.S. public overall (2020b). This could help bolster Latino voter turnout. Importantly, Latino voter turnout may be impacted by outreach from the campaigns and from non-partisan get out the vote efforts. How these pieces come together this fall remains to be seen.

Biden leads with Latino voters, reflecting historically strong, but varied, support for Democratic presidential candidates

The latest national polls from early June show Biden has a 58% to 33% advantage over Trump among Latino registered voters (Enten, 2020). Even so, Biden’s support among Latinos is below that Clinton had according to pre-election polls from 2016. Some analysts (Krause, 2020) have asked whether Biden could do better among Latino voters, especially given his performance among them in the Democratic primaries. Bernie Sanders won the Democratic Latino vote in many states, including California, Texas and Nevada, besting Biden (Gamboa, 2020).
Overall, 62% of Latino registered voters identify with the Democratic Party or lean towards it while 34% say the same about the Republican Party, according to a December 2019 Pew Research Center survey (Krogstad, Gonzalez-Barrera and Tamir, 2020).

Democratic presidential candidates have traditionally held a wide advantage among Latino voters, but the advantage has varied across the decades. In the 1980s, for example, the Democratic advantage ranged from 21 percentage points in 1980 to 39 percentage points in 1988. By the mid-1990s, Democrat Bill Clinton’s advantage among Latino voters over Republican Bob Dole reached a record 51 percentage points. But support for Democratic presidential candidates slipped in subsequent elections. In 2004, Democrat John Kerry won 58% of the Latino vote to Republican George W. Bush’s 40% -- a Democratic advantage of just 18 percentage points.

In 2008 and 2012, Democrat Barack Obama reversed the trend, winning the Latino vote by growing margins over Republican presidential candidates John McCain (36 percentage points) and Mitt Romney (44 percentage points).

In 2016, expectations were high that Hillary Clinton would win as high, if not a higher, share of the Latino vote as Obama did in 2012. Expectations were high because of the anti-immigrant, anti-Mexican and anti-Latino rhetoric of then presidential candidate Donald J. Trump (Phillips, 2017). About 28% of Latino voters nationally supported Trump, a share not much different from that of Mitt Romney (27%) in 2012 and John McCain (31%) in 2008, according to the National Election Pool’s National Exit Poll (Krogstad and Lopez, 2016). In 2016, the Democratic advantage fell to 38 percentage points.

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### Figure 4

**Bipartisan support among Latino voters for raising the minimum wage to $15/hour**

% who __ raising the minimum wage to $15/hour

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly oppose</th>
<th>Somewhat oppose</th>
<th>Somewhat favor</th>
<th>Strongly favor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Hispanic RVs</td>
<td>NET 21 9 12</td>
<td>23 56</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dem/Lean Dem</td>
<td>12 9</td>
<td>23 65</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep/Lean Rep</td>
<td>38 21 18</td>
<td>23 39</td>
<td>62</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Most Latino voters say gun laws should be more strict**

% saying gun laws should be ___ than they are today

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>More strict</th>
<th>About right</th>
<th>Less str</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Hispanic RVs</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dem/Lean Dem</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep/Lean Rep</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Most Latino voters say government should do more to solve problems**

% saying government ...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Is doing too many things better left to businesses and individuals</th>
<th>Should do more to solve problems</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Hispanic RVs</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dem/Lean Dem</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep/Lean Rep</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Based on Hispanic registered voters. Share of respondents who didn’t offer an answer not shown.


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Latino voters’ views of economic and social issues
Prior to the coronavirus outbreak, issues such as gun control, raising the minimum wage and immigration were rising concerns among Latino voters. But on many issues, Latinos are often split along partisan lines, just like all U.S. voters, though often not as sharply.
According to a Pew Research Center December 2019 survey, 79% of Latino registered voters expressed support for raising the nation’s minimum wage to $15 an hour. Seven-in-ten (71%) said it is the government’s responsibility to provide health care. Two-thirds (68%) support more strict gun laws. And overall, 71% say government should do more to solve problems (Krogstad, Lopez and Budiman, 2020).

Figure 5

Around seven-in-ten Latino voters say the federal government is responsible for ensuring all Americans have health care coverage

Is it the federal government’s responsibility to make sure all Americans have health care coverage? (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Not involved at all</th>
<th>Keep Medicare and Medicaid</th>
<th>Mix of private and government</th>
<th>National health insurance system</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Hispanic RVs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>28  NET 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dem/Lean Dem</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>49  NET 84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep/Lean Rep</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>19  NET 47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Based on Hispanic registered voters. Share of respondents who didn’t offer an answer not shown.

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These finding mask differences in views among Latinos who identify with or lean towards the Democratic Party and those who do the same with the Republican Party. For example, 80% of Latino Democrats say gun laws should be stricter than they are today while just 44% of Republicans say the same.
On immigration issues, the top priority for Latino registered voters is establishing a way for most immigrants in the country illegally to stay in the country legally (Gonzalez-Barrera, Krogstad and Noe-Bustamante, 2020). Some 83% say this is an important goal for U.S. immigration policy. Majorities also say improving border security (78%), taking in civilian refugees from countries where people are trying to escape violence and war (77%), and increasing security along the U.S.-Mexico border to reduce illegal crossing (70%) are all important goals for U.S. immigration policy. About half (48%) say increasing deportations of immigrants currently in the country illegally should be an important U.S. immigration policy goal, highlighting the split views of Latinos on some immigration issues. The same December survey found 57% of Latino registered voters think the U.S. does not have a responsibility to take in asylum seekers from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.
Who are Latino voters?
Latino eligible voters have some notable characteristics, according to tabulations from the 2018 American Community Survey from the U.S. Census Bureau. The first is the relative youth of the group. About half (49%) are either Millennials or younger – ages 18 to 37 in 2018, the latest year data is available. By comparison, just 30% of white eligible voters, 35% of Asian eligible voters and 39% of Black eligible voters are in the same age group.

Latino eligible voters are also more likely to be foreign born than either white or Black eligible voters (Budiman, Noe-Bustamante and Lopez, 2020). One-quarter of Latino eligible voters are naturalized U.S. citizens while just 3% of white eligible voters and 8% of Black eligible voters are naturalized immigrants. This trails the share (67%) foreign born among Asian eligible voters.

Latino eligible voters trace their roots to many places in Latin American and to Spain. But Mexicans are the single largest group, accounting for 58% of the total. Puerto Ricans make up another 13% of Latino eligible voters and 5% are Cuban, 3% Salvadoran and 3% Dominican. But these shares vary considerably by nativity. For example, among U.S.-born Latino eligible voters, 62% are Mexican and 18% are Puerto Rican. But among immigrant Latino eligible voters, fewer than half are Mexican (47%) while 10% are Cuban, 8% Dominican, 6% Salvadoran and 28% from other Latin American or Spanish origins.

About 18% of Latino eligible voters who are immigrants have a bachelor’s degree or higher, similar to the 17% for the U.S. born and below the 30% among all eligible voters. The 18% of all Latino eligible voters with a bachelor’s degree or higher represents a slight increase from the 15% with at least a bachelor’s degree in 2012.

About four-in-five (80%) Latino eligible voters speak English proficiently, though the share is substantially lower among immigrants. About 49% of Latino eligible voters who are immigrants are English proficient.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage Distribution</th>
<th>U.S.-born</th>
<th>Immigrant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Origins</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexican</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puerto Rican</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuban</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salvadoran</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other origin</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generations and age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generation Z (18 to 21)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Millennials (22 to 37)</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generation X (38 to 53)</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boomers (54 to 72)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silent/Greatest (73 to 90)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In years</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nativity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US born citizen</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naturalized US citizen</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English proficiency</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English only</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English very well</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English less than very well</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational attainment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than high school</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school graduate</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two-year degree/ Some college</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor’s degree or more</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual family income</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$68.0k</td>
<td>Median</td>
<td>$68.4k</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Eligible voters are U.S. citizens ages 18 and older.
Source: Pew Research Center analysis of 2018 American Community Survey (IPUMS)

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When comparing all Latino eligible voters to other racial and ethnic groups, only the Asian eligible voters have a lower share (71%) who speak English proficiently.

The median household income for Latino eligible voters who are immigrants is $66,400, slightly lower than the $68,400 median income of the U.S. born. Further, the $68,000 median household income for all Latino eligible voters is lower than the $75,000 for the national electorate.

Mapping the Latino Vote
The geographic distribution of Latino eligible voters is notable. Six states hold about three-quarters of Latino eligible voters – California, Texas, Florida, New York, Arizona, and Illinois (Noe-Bustamante, Budiman and Lopez, 2020). All six have over one-million Latino eligible voters. Florida has consistently been a battle ground and Arizona could join that list this year. Some even think Texas could be closer this year than in the past.

But Latinos are also dispersed across the country, with their shares among eligible voters rising nearly everywhere. Between 2012 and 2018, they grew by at least 50% in North Dakota (84%), South Dakota (64%), North Carolina (58%), Maryland (53%), Montana (52%), Minnesota (52%) and Rhode Island (51%). Latinos make up the highest share of eligible voters in New Mexico (43%), California (30%), Texas (30%), Arizona (24%) and Florida (20%). Meanwhile, the states where Latinos represent the lowest shares of eligible voters are West Virginia (1.1%), Maine (1.4%), Vermont (1.6%), Mississippi (1.6%) and Kentucky (1.7%).

The share among the Latino population that is eligible to vote also varies by state. In the states with the largest Latino populations, about half or more of Latinos are eligible to vote in Florida (57%), California (51%) and Texas (50%). About 71% of Maine’s Latino population is eligible to vote, as is 68% of Montana’s, the highest shares in the country. The two states with the lowest shares of Latino eligible voters are North Carolina and Tennessee, where just 33% in each are eligible.

Conclusion
The COVID-19 outbreak has upended life in the U.S. and has had a devastating impact on Latinos, which in turn could affect Latino participation in the upcoming election. But the coronavirus outbreak has also brought changes to the way states conduct elections, with vote-by-mail now likely in many states with large Latino populations. That could help Latino voter turnout.

Democrat Joe Biden leads President Trump nationally among Latino registered voters in recent polls, but his support remains below Clinton’s support in 2016. Meanwhile, Trump’s level of support among Latinos is little
changed from 2016 – about three-in-ten Latino registered voters say they would support him if the election were held today.

One thing remains clear: the number of Latinos eligible to vote has grown in importance and this year will eclipse the number of black eligible voters – the first presidential election where this is the case. A record number of Latinos are expected to vote in 2020 (as is the case each presidential election), helping to reshape the American electorate as it diversifies.

References


A Look into the Effects of COVID-19 on Hispanic Employment Expectations from the Household Pulse Survey

Alfredo A. Romero ²

There is no question that the COVID-19 pandemic and the economic recession induced by it has significantly affected the U.S. economy and the labor market in a manner not seen since the Great Depression. This is despite the major gains in the economy since the trough of the recession and the halving of the unemployment rate in the third quarter of 2020. While the short and medium run fate of the economy is uncertain, it is clear that the brunt of the economic consequences of the recession has been felt by Hispanics and other ethnic groups due to their overrepresentation in leisure and hospitality, some of the most affected industries in the country. This deleterious effect on the progress that Hispanics had made over the last twelve years will be compounded by the fact that the majority of Hispanics employed in these industries are employed by companies predominantly owned by minorities. A double whammy effect. And while the full extent of the economic consequences cannot yet be assessed and might not be for a long time (at the time of this writing, the second (third?) wave of COVID-19 cases seems to be underway), it might still be possible to compile some stylized facts. In what follows, I will delineate the economic fate of individuals older than 18 years of age and particularly of Hispanics as a group during the second quarter of 2020 using the first set of results from the first phase of the Household Pulse Survey conducted by the U.S. Census. The survey encompasses twelve weeks of data, starting from the week of April 23rd to May 5th 30th and ending in the week of July 16th to July 21st. Amongst the universe of data provided by the survey, I concentrate mainly on the income and employment entries for Hispanic and non-Hispanic groups accounting for sociodemographic information. One of the most interesting findings of this piece is the fact that the Hispanic population was one of the groups that were most impacted in terms of unemployment. Not only that but there are specific sectors within the Hispanic working population that were highly impacted, as a percentage, at a much higher level than others, providing evidence to the overrepresentation claim in the most affected industries.

Geographical Highlights

The Household Pulse Survey asked respondents for information regarding their ‘expectation’ and their ‘actual’ situation regarding employment status, food security, housing, physical and mental health, access to healthcare, and educational disruption. The surveys were conducted weekly and included anywhere from 40,000 to 75,000 households. Population weights were used to match the approximately 249 million people over 18 years of age. Below is a heat map of the answer to the question “Have you or has anyone in your household experienced a loss of employment income since last week?” over the 12 weeks of the study. Unsurprisingly, the most populous states reported the larger amount of people affected by the recession: California, Texas, Florida, and New York (Figure 1). Since the expectation is that the brunt of the recession has been felt by Hispanics and other minority groups due to their overrepresentation in the most affected industries, it is not surprising that the results hold for the same states when only the Hispanic population is taken into consideration. Thus, and not surprisingly, the Hispanic population in the U.S. also accounted for a large proportion of employment disruptions with a high employment disruption rate in those specific states (Figure 2).

Of the ethnic groups registered in the survey (Hispanic or Latino, White Non-Hispanic, Black Non-Hispanic, Asian Non-Hispanic, and Other Non-Hispanic), Hispanics as a group experienced the highest disruption in

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employment. At its peak, 64% percent of Hispanics experienced employment disruptions (Week 12) versus 45 percent of non-Hispanic whites during the same week.

*Figure 1: Employment Disruption [All Groups]*

*Author’s geographic analysis of the impact of COVID-19 pandemic by state. Individuals are at least 18 years of age at the time of the survey.*

*Figure 2: Employment Disruption [Hispanics]*

*Author’s geographic analysis of the impact of COVID-19 pandemic by state. Individuals are at least 18 years of age at the time of the survey.*

**Expectations Mismatch Highlights**

While looking closer at the weekly data, there is a peculiar empirical regularity characterized as a mismatch between the expectation of employment interruptions and actual employment interruptions that seems to have reached its widest at the worst moment of the first waves of business closures. During the first couple of weeks of survey data, approximately 93 million people were expecting employment disruptions while in fact close to 117 million experienced it. In other words, this pandemic was underestimated in terms of unemployment possibilities for the population of individuals over 18 over the entire period of study. Analogously, with respect to Hispanics, the group as a whole also underestimated the effect of this COVID-19 recession since there is a difference between expected unemployment and experienced unemployment of about 29% lower for expected unemployment on average. All in all, more than five in ten Hispanics (53%) reported to have experienced employment income disruptions due to the COVID-19 recession. Another
interesting fact about this particular dataset is that the expected employment disruption for the entire sample represents steadily decreases for the first 7 weeks of the survey finally leveling off thereafter (Figure 2), but always below the realized level of disruption. This is in sharp contrast to the steady increase in employment income disruptions throughout the 12 weeks of the survey. The same pattern can be observed with the Hispanic subsample although not in such a smooth fashion. One thing that is different is the steady increase in both actual and expected disruptions for the Hispanic group instead of the leveling off for the entire sample. This might be an indication that while all groups experienced expectations of employment disruptions at the beginning of the pandemic, not all groups continue to have the same expectation once economic activities were allowed to resume and white-collar workers were back on the job remotely. There is no question, however, that both the expectations and realization of employment disruptions were markedly different among ethnic groups.

*Figure 3: Experienced vs. Expected Labor Income Disruptions*

*Author’s calculations.*

**Demographic Stylized Facts**

Not surprisingly, the range of age most affected by the COVID-19 pandemic is from 25 to 39 followed by the 40 - 54 group range (Figure 4). Interestingly, for the younger group, the disruption does not seem to have followed a specific pattern nor for the group of individuals older than 65. For the group of individuals aged 55 to 64, there was a steady increase in employment income disruptions with the accompanying decrease in employment. Unfortunately, because of the aggregated nature of the data, it is not possible to separate these statistics by other sociodemographic factors.
Disaggregating by gender (Figure 5) shows that male and female on average suffered from the same drop in employment (53 to 49 percent for females and 52 to 48 by males). It will be interesting to know how these results hold up through the end of the summer and the third quarter of the economy once the data from the second phase of the survey is released. Again, because of the aggregated nature of the data, it is not possible to separate these statistics by other sociodemographic factors.

This will be a particularly important area of current and future research for the Hispanic community since it’s been the case that the coronavirus outbreak has significantly harmed the finances of U.S. Hispanics, particularly among Hispanic women. This situation, compounded to the care needs for the elderly and children, might exacerbate the exit of women from the labor force and prolong their return since traditionally it is Hispanic women who carry the burden of care for children and the elderly. Data from the survey (not shown) reveals that the expectations of employment income disruptions were consistently higher for women.
that for men throughout the entire sample timeframe. If this trend continues, this has the potential to wipe-out both the gains in terms of employment and income for Hispanics and their positioning in the economic ladder. Even before the outbreak, Hispanics were concerned about their economic situation despite near-record low-levels of unemployment through the end of 2019. I'm unable to filter for Hispanics only because of how the data is recorded, and instead use entire population under study in order to assess expectations. As argued, the number of women that reported either expected unemployment or experienced unemployment is higher than the ones reported for men (Figure 6).

Figure 6: Actual vs. Expected Employment Disruptions by Gender

*Author’s calculations.

The survey does provide disaggregated data by ethnicity based on the sector of employment: Private Company, Government, Self-employed or Family Business, Non-for-profit, and Other (Figure 7). I also added the percentage of people that reported to be unemployed during the week of the survey. The number of people that reported to be unemployed from the beginning of the survey to the end of phase 1 of the survey increased from 47 percent to 51 percent. There is, however, no drastic changes in the distribution of employment by industry for Hispanics. The only notable change in the proportion of employment by industry seems to be in the government sector, where the proportion of employed Hispanics decreased from approximately 8 percent to approximately 6 percent. All the other sectors seem to have retained the same proportion or decrease by approximately 1 percentage point. Of course, at this level of aggregation it is not possible to peek into the specific industries that comprise every sector.
Conclusion

All in all, the preceding stylized facts provide us with a roadmap for future Hispanic labor conditions research. There is a treasure trove of information coming down the pipeline that, along with the preliminary results from the first phase, can illuminate the change in socioeconomic conditions for the Hispanic population previous to, during, and post the pandemic.
A Revision of the Epidemic HIV in New York City: Health Disparities and Income Inequality Among Blacks and Hispanics

Juan J DelaCruz, Mohammad Jamal, Raymond Rivera & Pooja Singh 3

Background

The HIV/AIDS pandemic has been one of the deadliest health events in the history of humankind with more than 32 million deaths during the past 40 years. HIV has affected the lives of millions across the globe, and if left untreated can wreak havoc on the body’s immune system, leaving those infected vulnerable to opportunistic infections and eventually die. The World Health Organization (WHO, 2020-1) reported more than 38 million people living with HIV/AIDS globally but only 60% of those infected with the virus received antiretroviral treatment in 2018. Yet, 770,000 people died of HIV-related illness and 1.7 million new infections were recorded in the same year, showing that we still have a long way to go before this epidemic is contained. The region with the highest share of HIV positive individuals is Sub-Saharan Africa, where the epidemic is generalized (prevalence > 1%) and driven through heterosexual sex. Sub-Saharan Africa is the epicenter of the world epidemic, containing more than 2/3 of the total world population living with HIV. A sizable share of the new infections has been seen in Eastern and Southern Africa, accounting for 800,000 out of the global 1.7 million (AVERT, 2020).

In the United States, HIV/AIDS has transitioned from affecting mainly men who have sex with men (MSM) and injecting drug users to disproportionally affect African American men and later African American woman. Since the mid 1980’s Hispanics have experienced higher HIV rates than those for Whites. Nowadays, people 50 years and older living with HIV account for more than 70% of those with the disease (APA, 2020); long time survivors of the HIV epidemic are now growing older in the US. The Center of Disease Control and Prevention (CDC, 2020-1) estimated that in 2018 the number of HIV positive individuals in the United States were about 1.2 million people and among those, about 14% were unaware that they had contracted HIV. This epidemic is concentrated in vulnerable populations (prevalence<1%) across sexual orientation, race/ethnicity, gender and age. The social determinants of health explain that minority populations are more vulnerable to HIV due to the social context, lack of employment, socioeconomic status, access to healthcare and housing, which are factors affecting their wellbeing. HIV-infected individuals have experienced a substantial increase in longevity as a result of antiretroviral treatment (ART) and is comparable with the life span of the general population. In spite of their improved life expectancy, the quality of life of people with HIV has declined due to high prevalence of mental health illnesses. Loneliness, depression and substance use are strong predictors of low ART adherence rates, which leads to poor health and early death. These factors cause and exacerbate health-related inequalities with a larger impact on younger and older Hispanics with HIV.

New diagnoses (incidence) decreased by 7% between 2014 and 2018 in general, but these new infections varied heavily depending on demographics characteristics. For instance, men who have sex with men (MSM), heterosexual intercourse and injecting drug users comprised the largest shares of new diagnoses. By race, African Americans comprised 44% of new cases with Hispanics and Whites together accounted for 50% of the new cases. The most impacted subpopulations are African American MSM who accounted for 25% of new diagnoses followed by Hispanic MSM at 20%. HIV is largely clustered in urban areas being New York, San Francisco and Chicago the battlegrounds of this epidemic. The region with the highest rate of HIV in the US is the northeast and New York City (NYC) is the most affected area, with more than 100,000 people living with HIV/AIDS. Of the total number of HIV-infected individuals, the gender ratio was skewed towards males at

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72.2%. Three out of four of those living with HIV are receiving ART and the goal is to keep them adherent to this medical regime (AIDSVu, 2020). With an increased focus on linking individuals to the care they need, NYC has managed to achieve high viral suppression rate, which means the HIV-infected individual has fewer than 200 copies per milliliter of the virus in the bloodstream and more than 600 CD4 T-cells. This is significant because virally suppressed individuals have effectively no chance of transmitting HIV to their partners through sexual intercourse, which helps reduce the spread of HIV and eventually eradicate this illness from the face of earth. The cost-effectiveness of treatment and prevention needs more attention among economists.

**HIV-Related Disparities in NYC**

NYC is by far the epicenter of the HIV epidemic. Due to wide income inequalities and deep social stratification, NYC has been devastated by the AIDS epidemic more than any other city in the US. The implementation of successful evidence-based cost-effective interventions regarding testing, treatment and prevention have contributed to the sharp fall in general rates of HIV-related morbidity and mortality. Nevertheless, there are significant health disparities among minorities groups compared to the white population. Health disparities are differences in occurrences of morbidity and mortality rates related to disease in specific populations. Also, the disparate effect of the disease on Hispanics as a result of these psychosocial determinants is well documented in the current literature. Figure 1 depicts the poverty and HIV maps of NYC by zip codes where it is noticeable that poor neighborhoods, heavily populated by Blacks and Hispanics, display higher HIV rates. Hispanics suffer from a range of issues that intensify the severity of health disparities such as multi-morbidities, incarceration as well as cultural and linguistic barriers.

![Figure 1: HIV Rates and Poverty by Zip Code](image)

The source of health disparities among Hispanics with HIV arises from barrier to healthcare and health insurance, low socioeconomic status, lack of legal residential status in the US, scarcity of healthcare providers who are sensitive to issues facing Hispanics, lack of acculturation, and poor health literacy. Although Hispanic men make up the majority of new infections among Hispanics (76%) and have an incidence of HIV twice that of non-Hispanic White men, Hispanic women are four times more likely to be infected than non-Hispanic White women. The co-occurrence of HIV with behaviorally rooted conditions such as substance abuse, sexually transmitted infections (STI) and intimate partner violence (IPV) further contribute to the disparities in morbidity and mortality experienced by Hispanic women (Peragallo et al, 2012).

Disparities resulting from HIV incidence, measured by new diagnoses, are more striking when stratified by gender (Figure 2). HIV incidence is lower among women than is for men. Successful outreach and clinical interventions have produced fewer people being diagnosed every year, yet the rate of this decrease is higher for men, while has steadily decreased over the years for women. Because people with HIV under ART live longer, the overall number of people living with HIV is slowly increasing; the graph shows the number of men
with HIV decreasing while the curve for women appear to flatten. In order to keep this gender gap relatively small, outreach and prevention need to be continuously enforced.

**Figure 2: HIV/AIDS by Gender**

Figure 3 shows that as HIV incidence has taken a dive with the biggest improvement in reduction of new cases occurred among Whites. Although new diagnoses among Blacks and Hispanics have continuously decreased, incidence still is the highest within these groups. Regarding prevalence, Blacks and Hispanics have been greatly affected by the disease. Black males are 3.1 times more likely to have HIV than Whites while Hispanic men are 2.2 times more likely to have the virus. The HIV disparity is greater for Black and Hispanic women when compared to White women. According to the Center for Disease Control, Hispanics makeup 17% of the United States population, but account for 23% of new HIV infections and, in NYC alone, Hispanics accounted for 36.4% of new HIV infections while only making up 29.1% of the city’s population (CDC, 2020-2; NYC Health, 2019; USCB, 2020). As HIV/AIDS death rates for Whites and African Americans have decreased at about the same rates, Hispanic death rates seem to have plateaued. This inequity among racial/ethnic groups suggest that culturally tailored prevention and treatment strategies are needed to lower HIV among minority groups. The cost-effectiveness of HIV interventions is poorly understood.

**Figure 3: HIV/AIDS by Race/Ethnicity**

Figure 4 depicts the impact of HIV across age groups. Early during the epidemic, the majority of infections occurred among people in their productive and reproductive lives, being the young to middle age adult group the most affected. Additionally, mother-to-child transmission and blood transfusions accounted for a large number of new cases. As it stands now, the overall infection rate among mother-to-child remains extremely low and those who receive blood transfusions is eradicated. New infections are driven by working age people and older adults. However, HIV-infected individuals are living longer, thus age groups are rapidly shifting as prevalence for older adults surpassed the number of people in the working-age population in 2015. HIV/AIDS deaths among 50 year and older has been on a steady rise as individuals who were infected age and die, while conversely deaths among 20- to 49-year-old have dropped sharply, most likely due to receiving treatment for their condition. In 2014 a huge milestone was achieved when the number of older adults with HIV surpassed
the number of 20 to 49-year-old living with HIV (NYC Health, 2020). The increased in the number of older adults with HIV can be explained by their adherence to ART that promotes undetectable levels of viral load and high CD4 T-cells in the blood stream. Virally suppressed individuals are more likely to fight opportunistic infections and less likely to spread the infection to others. This gives hope to the eventual end of the epidemic in NYC.

**Figure 4: HIV/AIDS by Age Groups**

![HIV incidence by age groups](https://www1.nyc.gov/site/doh/data/data-sets/hiv-aids-annual-surveillance-statistics.page)

*Source of All Figures: NYC Department of Health and Mental Hygiene.*

**HIV Interventions and the Hispanic Community in NYC**

HIV prevalence and incidence among Hispanics has been high and is rapidly growing. They are considered a group more severely impacted by HIV than Whites. They confront unique social challenges in coping with this disease and face barriers to access the healthcare system. The economics of HIV and its impact on Hispanics needs to be further explored. In Gonzalez et al (2009), epidemiological results show the disproportionate impact of HIV/AIDS on Hispanics, which is characterized by less access to appropriate care. Data on substance use and mental health of HIV-positive Hispanics suggest that both problems negatively impact health outcomes and health behaviors for people with HIV, including risky sex and HIV treatment adherence. Substance use and mental health disorders have been linked to HIV/STI risk, but studies have rarely included Hispanic women, who have over four times greater HIV incidence than white, non-Hispanic women. There is an unmet need for culturally sensitive intervention research to address treatment adherence, drug abuse, and mental health factors among HIV-positive Hispanics. Improving access to health and behavioral care may be particularly important targets for intervention targeting Hispanic groups. Greater efforts should be made to enroll Hispanics in behavioral intervention trials and to examine outcomes by ethnicity.

Culturally adapted interventions can be cost-effective in this population but there is little evidence regarding the cost of ART care and the metrics to assess effectiveness of treatment. Relationships among substance use, depression and risky sexual behaviors for people with HIV are seldom addressed in cost-effectiveness analyses and economic evaluation of health programs. An example of a tailored intervention is Familias Unidas (United Families, UF), which is a family-centered, evidence-based substance use and sexual risk behavior prevention intervention for Hispanic youth and their families at the family, peer, and school level. The efficacy of UF in preventing adolescent substance use, unsafe sexual behavior, and externalizing disorders and “results showed that, relative to a Community Control condition, UF was efficacious in preventing or reducing externalizing disorders, preventing and reducing substance use, and in reducing unsafe sexual behavior” (Patin et al, 2009). UF is regarded as an effective behavioral intervention program in reducing risk of unsafe behaviors which may result in contracting HIV.
In Peragallo et al (2012), the Salud, Educación, Promoción y Autocuidado (Health, Education, Promotion and Self-care, HEPS) is a culturally targeted HIV risk reduction intervention that focuses on Hispanic women to address communication, condom negotiation/use and violence prevention. A randomized trial was performed to test the efficacy of HEPS with 548 adult U.S. Hispanic women. Using intent-to-treat analyses, outcomes in this study show that HEPS substantially decreased the number of STI cases, improved condom use, decreased substance use and reduced domestic violence. This is an illustration that culturally specific interventions are promising tools for preventing HIV for Hispanic women in the US. Finally, the Mobile Technology and Incentives (MOTIVES) intervention uses mobile technology-based and behavioral economics to address HIV prevention among vulnerable populations (Linnemayr et al, 2018). The use of behavioral economics suggests that small "nudges" can initiate and sustain behavior change. This study examines the effectiveness and acceptability of HIV prevention intervention that uses text messages combined with economic incentives to improve retention of HIV prevention information. This intervention promoted the frequency of HIV testing among Hispanic MSM and transgender women.

**Conclusions**

Testing, surveillance and treatment (medical and behavioral) become important tools in the fight against HIV/AIDS and in the design of health interventions. More economic assessment regarding the costs, benefits and effectiveness of treatment are encouraged. NYC has taken proactive steps towards reducing the rate of HIV infections through a myriad of programs designed to educate and support vulnerable populations, most notably, the use of Pre-Exposure Prophylaxis (PrEP) care, the provision of ART for HIV-negative individuals, which is highly effective in preventing HIV infection. The implementation of culturally tailored interventions has facilitated the access to minority communities. Furthermore, the upsurge of treatment and prevention advertising presented in the Spanish media has been geared towards specific segments of the Latino community such as Puerto Ricans, Dominicans and Mexicans, the largest ethnic groups with HIV in the metropolitan area (NYC Health, 2017). Targeting risky behavior groups with medical care, mental health treatment and legal counseling is necessary to lower HIV morbidity and mortality rates among the most vulnerable groups (Zhang et al, 2019). For Hispanics and Hispanic women with HIV suffering moderate to severe depression, an integrated medical and behavioral system is necessary to maximize health outcomes. Economic and evaluation studies should test whether integrated and tailored risk reduction interventions affect these factors and lower HIV/STI risk for Hispanic women (McCabe et al, 2017).

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The differential impact of COVID19 on Latinas' labor market experience

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Throughout 2020, the impact of the COVID19 pandemic reached every corner of the country. The expression "We are all in this together" has been an emblematic sign in formal and informal conversations. However, it dilutes the differential impact that the pandemic has had across and within different demographic groups, including gender, racial and ethnic groups. One example is the case of Latinas and the impact of COVID19 on their labor market outcomes, life, and overall wellbeing. At first sight, it seems that Latinas face similar economic vulnerability patterns when compared to other minority groups on average, such as a disproportionate share working in low-pay jobs with a lack of benefits, having low average levels of wealth accumulation, less access to healthcare, and facing lower workplace safety measures than the overall workforce. However, as we discuss in this article, as the general patterns of the COVID19’s impacts converged when the labor market began recovering, its differential effect on Latinas versus other groups emerged.

When the unemployment rate peaked in April 2020, over one-fifth (20.2%) of Latina workers ages 20 and older were unemployed—the highest rate of all the major racial/ethnic groups. One of the reasons is that Latinas tend to be more likely to work in sectors severely affected by the pandemic. For example, in an August 2020 report, the Economic Policy Institute (Gould, Perez, and Wilson, 2020)4 reported that 33% of Latinas work in leisure and hospitality (15%), other services (6%), and retail sectors (12%), contrasting with the proportion of white women (25%), white men (22%), and Latinos (27%) working in these sectors. Further, 48% of Latinas are in the top three occupations most affected by COVID19. Meanwhile, only 16.2% of Hispanics were able to work from home compared to approximately 30% of workers overall (Gould and Shierholz, 2020).5

Furthermore, other demographic characteristics, including family composition, are also likely important factors explaining why Latinas are also being impacted differently given the impact of COVID19 on childcare and school closures. A report from the Pew Research Center (2015) using data from the 2014 American Community Survey shows that Latinos have bigger families and more children.6 According to this report, 50% of Latina mothers ages 40-44 have given birth to 3 or more children, which is higher than the percentage of Black and White mothers (40% and 33%, respectively). Furthermore, Latino children are more likely to be living in a single-parent household than non-Latino white children (29% of Latino children versus 19% of white children). Thus, Latinas' labor market experience under COVID19 is likely to be negatively affected by childcare and school closures.

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The current pandemic crisis is different to the previous economic crisis, because as Mankiw (2020) notes, the 2020 recession is a 'recession by design' and not a 'recession by accident'. The stay-at-home and lockdown orders have been the main drivers behind the shutting down of business and consumption dynamics that resulted in a labor market disruption. Thus, this crisis has impacted sectors that are highly dependent on individuals' regular consumption.

This brief article discusses the different trends in unemployment rates, labor force participation rates, and other labor market outcomes among Latinas, compared to other racial/ethnic groups shortly before and during the COVID19 pandemic. For this, we use the most recent monthly estimates from the Current Population Survey (IPUMS-CPS, January 2019- October 2020) and a sample of individuals age 25 to 65 to focus on the prime working age population. In the discussion, we use the following groups: Latinas, Latinos, white women, white men, black women, and black men. We emphasize the terms Latina (Hispanic women) and Latino (Hispanic men) to differentiate genders among Hispanics. Meanwhile, the groups white and black women and men do not include Latinos/as in this article.

The negative impact of COVID19 on unemployment rates and labor force participation rates is larger for Latinas.

Figure 1 combines the trend of our estimated unemployment rate and the percentage of those individuals where being laid off as the reasons for being unemployed. Because the data are not seasonally adjusted, and to facilitate the visual comparison, we identify the month of March in 2019 and in 2020. As shown in panel (a) of Figure 1, the pandemic's initial impact is immediately reflected in March 2020. This first shock affected all groups. However, Latinas were the most affected group at first, showing the highest unemployment rate (18%) in our sample in comparison to Latinos (15%) and white and black women (13% and 14% respectively) and men (10% and 15% respectively). Like all groups, Latinas' unemployment rates had not returned to pre-COVID19 levels by October 2020.

When asked about the main reason for being unemployed, Latinas and white women were more likely to respond they were laid off than other groups (83% and 85% respectively). Furthermore, between Latinas and white females, Latinas continued reporting being laid off as the main reason for unemployment by October 2020 (35% compared to 26% respectively). Looking at these two indicators, it appears that for Latinas, the increase in unemployment was disproportionately due to job separations stemming from employers' decisions and not a result of temporal transitions from the individuals' positions, when compared to other racial/ethnic and gender groups.

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Moreover, a distinctive component among Latinas is that, before the pandemic crisis, they had the lowest labor force participation rate in the labor market compared to other groups (about 15 percentage points less than Latinos and white men).\textsuperscript{9} At the same time, despite being lower than for other groups, their labor force participation rates had been rising, continuing a longer-term trend.\textsuperscript{10}

As Figure 2 shows, Latinas had a sharper decline in their labor force participation rates than the other groups with a slower recovery, increasing the existing gap in this rate between Latinas and the other groups. The combination of these components – layoffs and disproportionate reduction of labor force participation - raises the question about Latinas’ overall position in the economy due to COVID19. Despite the fact that some Latinas returned to the labor force during the summer of 2020 (bringing labor force participation rate to 68%, just one percentage point below the rate in comparable period in 2019) their participation rates had not caught up to pre-COVID19 levels when this article was written.\textsuperscript{11}

\textsuperscript{9} Please note that our estimations here could differ than those provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) because we use 25 years and older, while the BLS uses 20 years and older. Further, we use the public version of the IPUMS-CPS that is not designed to exactly replicate estimates that use confidential data. Also, our estimates are weighted.

\textsuperscript{10} For a more detailed discussion on differences in labor force participation rates of Latinas versus Latinos and other groups over time, see Mora and Dávila (2018, https://www.epi.org/press/the-hispanic-white-wage-gap-has-remained-wide-and-held-steady-for-decades/).

\textsuperscript{11} Latinas reached their highest labor force participation rate of 70% in October 2019.
Not finding a job and family reasons are major factors behind higher Latina unemployment rates and lower labor force participation rates

Figure 3 shows the percentage of individuals from the different racial/ethnic groups discussed here who are not participating in the labor market because they cannot find a job or for family reasons, according to the IPUMS CPS basic monthly data. Here we observe that the proportion of Latinas responding they could not find a job more than doubled right after the COVID19 crisis. Also, while the relatively low Latina labor force participation rate related to their relatively high incidence of family reasons before the pandemic, the reduction in their participation in the labor market as COVID19 got underway was not initially due to family reasons (i.e., childcare issues or family responsibilities), but mostly due to the lack of finding jobs as noted earlier. However, by fall 2020, these two reasons became the most important ones defining Latinas' low labor market participation.12

If we look at these trends together, the reasons why Latinas are not currently working along with the pronounced spike in their unemployment rate, at least three critical questions emerge. First, the basic question that started this article, what has happened to Latinas? Second, has this shock led to a structural change affecting Latinas' participation in the labor market? Third, how much do Latinas bear of the intrahousehold responsibilities due to this crisis's particularities? If we examine the other two female groups reported here, family reasons slowly became the most important reason for their decline in labor force participation. The recession identifies a change in the distribution of the burden of family responsibilities towards women (reflecting why some social scientists and labor market analysts started using the term

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“she-cession” during this time), with Latinas being impacted to a larger degree than white and black women due to their difficulties of finding jobs.

**Figure 3: Reason for not participating in the labor force**

![Graph](image)

Source: IPUMS-CPS January 2019-October 2020. Authors’ calculations. White and Black Women and Men groups do not include Latinos/as.

To better understand the impact of COVID19 on the labor market experiences of Latinas, we also look at the COVID19-specific questions added to the 2020 CPS (Figure 4, all panels). Compared to white women, Latinas were more likely to say that they could not find job because of the pandemic. However, comparing Latinos and whites, we find that unemployed Latinos were more likely to report being unable to work because of their employers closing their businesses due to the pandemic (more than 25% of them answered yes to this question) compared to white women and white men (panel a). The shock was first more severely received by Latinos, but then it equalized between Latinas and Latinos.

According to the Gould et al. EPI report cited previously, Latinas were already less likely to telework than all other groups before the crisis. With COVID19 and the massive transfer of jobs to home offices, teleworking now has a different meaning. The capacity to telework has allowed workers to keep their jobs, representing a job security tool that mitigated the shock's impact. More specifically, it has allowed many women to 'balance' family and work responsibilities. However, this 'balance' translates into families performing double duties between work responsibilities and child care as schools shut down. Not surprisingly then, we find that white women were the first ones moving to telework after the shock; meanwhile, employed Latinas were able to adjust at the level of white men (Figure 4, plane b). However, we need to keep in mind that these numbers include a small proportion of employed Latinas likely to be in the sectors that would allow this kind of "place of work shift". They do not include those who lost their jobs and were unable to find other employment during the pandemic, which as we noted represented a significant share of the Latina workforce.
According to our estimates from the CPS monthly sample, Latinas are more likely to have children, have younger children, and be single parents. From the same IPUMS-CPS sample used in our analysis, Latinas and to a lesser extent, black women, are more likely to have kids (64% of Latinas and 49% of black women have at least one child at home compared to 47% of white women). They are also more likely to be single mothers (10% of Latinas and 19% of black women are single with at least one child at home compared to 4% for white women). Latinas are more likely to have children younger than six at home (17%) than black and white women (both 13%). They are also more likely to be single parents of children under age six (4% of Latinas and 6% of black women are single parents of kids under age six compared to only 1.4% of white women). Among single parents, Latinas would have on average more children than the other groups (2 for Latinas versus 1.8 for black women), with greater chances of having younger children (0.42 average number of kids under age 5 for Latinas versus 0.38 for black women).

We need a more in-depth look at Latinas’ future

This report provides a brief overview of changes in labor market outcomes – including unemployment, labor force participation rates, and reasons for being unemployed – for Latinas compared to Latinos and white and black women and men before and during the COVID19 pandemic (up through October 2020). Our findings indicate that the labor market outcomes from COVID19 disproportionately impacted Latinas, at least initially (as their unemployment rate surged to a higher level than for other groups). Further, the restoration in their labor force participation rate has lagged behind other groups partly stemming from family reasons.13

It should be noted that this article is not meant to be an exhaustive analysis of Latina labor market dynamics as other important outcomes, such as movements between full-time to part-time jobs, changes in wages,

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occupational mobility within and between firms, would also be of interest. Moreover, such an analysis should further explore differences between Latina sub-groups, including for national-origin identification (e.g., Mexican Americans versus Puerto Ricans), immigrants versus U.S. natives, regional effects, among others. For example, a preliminary review of our data indicates that most of the dynamics we report here are dominated by Mexican American Latinas; this finding is not surprising given that Mexican Americans represent the majority (approximately 60%) of the Latino/a population in the U.S.

Issues surrounding the role of Latinas in the household, such as taking care of children and other family members, will also be important considerations to better understand their labor market implications from the COVID19 recession. For example, with larger families living in their households than other demographic groups, Latina workers will likely continue to encounter limited employment opportunities the longer it takes for childcare centers and schools to fully reopen.

Before closing, it is worth noting that Latinas represented one of the fastest-growing workforces in the U.S. before COVID19, driven not only by the relatively high Latino/a population growth rate but also by the disproportionate increase in Latinas’ labor force participation rates. It follows that a full recovery of the U.S. labor market will likely be delayed if targeted attention is not given to understanding specific factors affecting the labor market recovery for Latinas.

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